THE
final report into the tragic fire on board the Maersk Honam in March 2018 that killed five crew has concluded that
safety systems onboard the 15,000-TEU vessel were insufficient
to combat the blaze and the regulations governing the stowage of dangerous
goods contributed to the fire.
However,
Singapore's Transport Safety Investigation Bureau (TSIB) at the Ministry of Transport in its report concluded that the causes of the
initial ignition of the cargo may never be known.
The
vessel, which was delivered to the Danish shipping giant at the end of
August, 2017, less than six months before the fire, had left Singapore after
loading boxes, crucially 204 containers into cargo hold number 3, where the
fire was to first break out.
According
to the report much of the evidence into the causes of the fire was destroyed so
it is "it is not possible to conclusively determine the cause of the
fire."
However,
the master reported that there was a smell of chlorine, as he made his way to
the bridge from his cabin at the time but could not see any smoke.
Amongst
the cargo loaded onboard, the cargo within bay 3 included a container of Sodium Dichloroisocyanurate Dihydrate (SDID) - which is classified
under Class 9 in the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code. Class 9 is a
coverall class, effectively SDID is registered under the miscellaneous section.
The
report explains SDID is an active ingredient in dry bleaches, dishwashing
compounds, scouring powder detergent sanitisers, swimming pool disinfectants,
water, and sewage treatment.
SDID
contains a chlorine content of 56 per cent and it is this that is thought to
have been the cause of the chlorine smells reported by a number of crew.
In
its conclusions the TSIB said, "The investigation revealed that the
secondary hazards of chemical decomposition/ instability of SDID had not been
identified in the IMDG4 Code. This is because SDID was classified under Class 9
in the IMDG Code, instead of the more stringent Class 5.1 (oxidising
substances), despite having similar chemical properties as those in Class
5.1."
The
report went on to say that, "The special provisions (SP135) within the
IMDG Code allows for the classification and carriage of SDID under Class 9 (UN
No.3077), thus not recognising the potential thermal instability of this
material, possibly as a result of legacy carriage requirements recognised
nearly 40 years prior. As a result, despite these secondary hazards, SDID was
stowed under-deck where the main means of fixed firefighting in this area was
CO2, which was ineffective to tackle fires associated with such
materials."
Acknowledging
the gap in the regulations, the report added, "Noting the secondary hazards
presented by SDID, which are not captured in the current provisions of the IMDG
Code, the provisions in the IMDG Code would need to be reviewed. In the
interim, appropriate measures, similar to those adopted for calcium
hypochlorite as identified by CINS could be considered for adoption."
In
addition to the inadequate regulations regarding stowage the Singapore
investigation found that SDID as an oxidiser "required the use of abundant
water, which could not have been achieved promptly, given the existing
statutory requirements for firefighting measures for container fires
under-deck."
Recognising
the inadequacy of the mandated firefighting equipment on board modern container
ships, Captain Amarinder Singh Brar, a former container ship master and now an Associate
with London Offshore Consultants, said that the regulations were over 30 years
out of date for the latest generation of containerships.
Source : HKSG / Photo : Splash 247.
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